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The Socioeconomic Determinants of Crime in Ireland from 2003-2012 
Abstract 
This paper analyses the socioeconomic determinants of property crime and violent crime in 
Ireland between 2003 and 2012. The aim of the study is to determine whether individuals 
respond to incentives when deciding to engage in crime and whether this decision is dependent 
on the type of crime an individual engages in. The results of the paper support the economic 
theory of crime which indicates that criminals respond to incentives, particularly for property 
crimes. Higher rates of crime detection are associated with a fall in crime rates across all 
property crimes. Higher detection rates have been found to reduce crime rates for property 
crimes while the impact on violent crimes is found to be insignificant. The socioeconomic 
determinants of crime tend to be more ambiguous.  
I. Introduction 
This paper analyses the socioeconomic determinants of property crime and violent crime in 
Ireland between 2003 and 2012. The aim of the study is to determine whether individuals 
respond to incentives when deciding to engage in crime and whether this decision is dependent 
on the type of crime an individual engages in. The analysis uses data from the Central Statistics 
Office in Ireland (2015) which provides data for a detailed set of crime categories based on 
administrative data provided by the An Garda Síochana from their PULSE system. The CSO 
Annual Crime Statistics provides data for six Garda regions, which comprise of 28 Garda 
Divisions. However, socioeconomic data sourced from CSO is only available at a county level 
and as such Garda divisional data has been aggregated to the county level. This provides this 
paper with a unique dataset to estimate the impact the determinants of crime in Ireland.  
The seminal work of Becker (1968) and Ehrlich (1973) led to a wave of empirical work 
examining the socioeconomic determinants of crime. Becker stressed that “crime is an 
economically important activity or ‘industry’ . . . almost total neglected by economists” (1968, 
p. 170). Since then, many studies have investigated whether individuals respond to incentives 
to engage in criminal activities. Incentives can be classified as both ‘carrot’ and ‘stick’. For 
example, more opportunities in the illegal labour market may induce individuals to leave the 
labour market in favour of criminal activities whereas higher apprehension rates and longer 
incarceration rates may dissuade individuals from engaging in criminal activities. 
Much of the research on the economics of crime has been conducted in the United States 
(Becker, 1968; Ehrlich, 1972; Freeman, 1983; Chiricos, 1987; Grogger, 1998; Levitt 1998, 
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1999, 2001) with further studies emerging in UK (Wolpin, 1978; Witt et al., 1998, 1999; 
Carmichael and Ward, 2000, 2001; Machin and Meghir, 2004, Han et al, 2013) but as yet 
studies in Ireland have been scarce. Denny et al (2004) estimate the determinants of burglaries 
in Ireland between 1952 and 1998. They find that while imprisonment and detection act as 
powerful forces for reducing crimes, were unable to find any robust effect from direct measures 
of labour market activity such as unemployment rates or wage levels. More recently, Hagenden 
(2015) estimates the impact of an increase in the number of people on the Live Register on 
crime rates. The findings indicate increases in unemployment lead to an increase in crime, 
although the impact is more evident in property crimes, as opposed to violent crimes.  
This paper offers significant contributions compared to previous studies carried out in Ireland. 
Firstly, to the best of my knowledge this paper is the first which attempts to test the theoretical 
model of crime outlined by Becker (1968) across different categories of crime using economic, 
social and law enforcement variables in Ireland. Secondly, previous studies in Ireland fail to 
incorporate the dynamics of crime into their analysis. This paper includes lagged crime rate as 
an explanatory variable to capture crime dynamics. Thirdly, the inclusion of lagged 
endogenous variable as an explanatory variable requires the adoption of an instrumental 
variable estimation by using a Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimation. Most work 
in the area has used times series analysis and OLS methods so this paper offers advantages in 
methodology. Much of this work is hampered by endogeneity issues as a result of the reverse 
causation between crime rates and deterrence variables. This paper controls for endogeneity 
employing an instrumental variable approach for panel. Finally, the time period included in 
this study is significant for Ireland as a result of the emergence of the financial crisis which 
deeply impacted the Irish economy. In this vein Kelly (2009) warned that “Ireland is at the start 
of an enormous, unplanned social experiment on how rising unemployment affects crime, 
domestic violence, drug abuse, suicide, and a litany of other social pathologies”.  
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 outlines a review of the previous 
literature in the area, section 3 highlights the data used for this study while section 4 outlines 
the methodology and model specification. Section 5 shows the results of the estimations and 
section 6 concludes the article. 
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1. Socioeconomic Determinants of Crime –Theory to Empirics 
 
The analysis of crime as an economic activity goes back to the work of Becker (1968).  Becker 
(1968) provided a model in which individuals optimally choose whether or not they will 
commit crimes. Under Becker’s model of crime, individuals rationally analyse the costs and 
benefits of engaging in crimes. Benefits (denoted “B”) include the financial reward for 
engaging in crime as well as potential psychological benefits of crime. Furthermore, decisions 
are influenced by the probability of being caught (denoted “C”), severity of punishment 
(denoted “p”) and the opportunity cost in terms of other activity forgone e.g. employment in 
legal labour market (denoted “W”).  
Thus, the net benefits an individual receives from engaging in crime is equal to B-pC. 
Therefore, individuals will engage in crime when: 
(i) B-pC>W 
Attitudes towards risk are central to economic models of criminal choice. For example, risk 
adverse individuals will respond more to changes in the chances of being apprehended than to 
changes in the extent of punishment, other things being equal. An empirical test of Becker’s 
model involves testing whether people do actually respond to changes in such costs and 
benefits (Han et al, 2013). However, opportunity costs seem to be absent from the model 
(Oliver, 2002). Ehrlich (1973) addressed this issue by developing a model which allows 
individuals allocate his time freely between legal and illegal labour markets. Furthermore, 
Ehrlich analysed additional socioeconomic determinants of crime such as an individual’s level 
of income and unemployment rates. His aim, however, is still maximising the expected utility. 
The rest of the section highlights the empirical tests of various economic, social and law 
enforcement variables on crime. 
Deterrence and Crime 
Deterrence is an important subject not least because it lowers crime rates but furthermore in 
comparison to incapacitation it is relatively cheap. Researchers have used a variety of 
deterrence variables to examine the determinants of crime including detection rates (Denny et 
al, 2004; Han et al, 2010; Bandyopadhyay et al, 2011), clear up rates (Wolpin, 1978; Edmark, 
2005) and number of police (Levitt, 1997; Lin, 2009; Chalfin and McCrary, 2014; Bun, 2015). 
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These studies have generally found crime deterrence variables to reduce crime rates, 
particularly for property crimes.  
Unemployment and Crime  
Many studies have focused on the relationship between crime and employment. Early reviews, 
like Freeman (1983) and Chiricos (1987) generally find small, positive effects of 
unemployment on crime, but the results are inconsistent across studies and are certainly not 
major determinants of crime. Chiricos (1987) finds that unemployment has a statistically 
significant positive effect on property crime in 40 percent of the studies, while the effect on 
violence is only statistically significant positive in 22 percent of the study. The notion that 
unemployment encourages criminal behaviour as a result of increasing incentives is appealing 
and grounded in the notion that people respond to incentives. However, results of studies 
estimating the impact of unemployment on crime tend to be ambiguous in nature and 
robustness. One explanation for the lack of consensus in estimation results is that many people 
who engage in crime are also part of the legitimate labour force. Reuter et al. (1990) and 
Freeman (1999) document how the majority of those who participate in the illegal sector 
simultaneously derive income from legitimate jobs. Moreover, Imrohoroglu et al. (2001) 
predict that about 79% of the people engaging in criminal activities are employed and only the 
remaining 21% are unemployed.  
Results indicate that unemployment has a greater impact on crimes against property rather than 
crimes against the person. Edmark (2005) studies the relationship between unemployment and 
crime in Sweden between 1988 and 1999, a particularly volatile period in the labour market. 
The results show that unemployment had a positive and significant effect on some property 
crimes.  Bandyopadhyay et al. (2011) examine the impact of unemployment on six different 
crime types across 43 police force areas in the United Kingdom using quantile analysis. The 
results indicate that not only does unemployment increase crime but it does so more in high 
crime areas. Moreover, they find that the crime-reducing effect of higher detection rates is 
stronger in low-crime areas. Also, Entorf and Sieger (2014) estimate the impact of 
unemployment on crime in Germany find while both conventional OLS and quantile 
regressions confirm the positive link between unemployment and crime for property crimes, 
results for assault differ with respect to the method of estimation. Studies examining the 
impacts of unemployment on crime in Ireland tend to be scarce. Recently, Hargaden (2015) 
examines the relationship between crime and the labour market in Ireland between 2003 and 
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2014. Using OLS, FD and IV estimation techniques Hargaden (2015) estimates property crime 
elasticity of about 0.5. This implies that a 10% rise in numbers on the Live Register increases 
thefts and burglaries by 5%. As expected, there is a much weaker connection between the 
labour market and violent crime. 
Income and Crime 
Ehrlich (1973) proposes the mean family income should be taken as proxy for illegal income 
opportunities. He argues that a higher income level means higher transferable assets and thus 
more lucrative targets for potential criminals. Contrastingly, other studies have used mean 
income as a proxy for legal income opportunities with higher income associated with more 
rewarding legal jobs. As such, ambiguity exists when interpreting the results of the impact of 
income on different types of crime. Gould et al. (2002) notes that both wages and 
unemployment are significantly related to crime, but that wages played a larger role in the 
crime trends over the last few decades. 
Baharom and Habibullah (2008) study the relationship between income, unemployment and 
crime in 11 European countries using panel data analysis between 1993 and 2001 for both 
aggregated (total crime) and disaggregated (subcategories) crime. Their results show that both 
income and unemployment have an important relationship with both aggregated and 
disaggregated crime. Crime displays positive significant relationship with income for all the 
categories except for domestic burglary. Entorf and Spengler (2000, p.85) suggest a relative 
income measure may be more straightforward to interpret. The authors highlight a measure of 
relative income which measures the percentage distance between the income of individual 
states and the mean income of all states and note that “a higher income inequality, for instance, 
may lead to worse legal income opportunities and, at the same time, to better illegal income 
opportunities for the lower quantiles of the income distribution”.  
Young Population and Crime 
Young persons as a percentage of the population are included in many studies estimating the 
effects of deterrence on crime as they are considered the most likely socio-demographic age 
group to engage in criminal activities. Grogger (1998, p. 756) notes: “Thirty five percent of all 
Philadelphia males born in 1945 were arrested before the age of 18, and one-third of all 
Californian men born in 1956 were arrested between the ages of 18 and 30”. Narayan and 
Smyth (2004), in their study on Australia, examine the relationship between seven different 
categories of property crime and violent crime against the person, male youth unemployment 
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and real male average weekly earnings between 1964 and 2001. The findings indicate that 
fraud, homicide and motor vehicle theft are cointegrated with male youth unemployment and 
real male average weekly earnings. However, there is no evidence of a long-run relationship 
between either breaking and entering, robbery, serious assault or stealing with male youth 
unemployment and real male average weekly earnings. Denny et al. (2004) explain the 
evolution of the trend in burglary in Ireland in terms of demographic factors: in this case the 
share of young males in the population, the macro-economy in the form of consumer 
expenditure and two characteristics of the criminal justice system : the detection rate for these 
crimes and the size of the prison population. The share of young males is associated with higher 
levels of these crimes. However, the authors were unable to find any robust effect from direct 
measures of labour market activity such as unemployment rates or wage levels. 
II. Data  
Dependent Variables  
This paper uses Irish crime data sourced from the Central Statistics Office (CSO). CSO 
provides a detailed set of crime categories based on administrative data provided by the An 
Garda Síochana from their PULSE system. The crime categories are based on the Irish Crime 
Classification System (ICCS). The CSO Annual Crime Statistics provides data for six Garda 
regions, which comprise of 28 Garda Divisions.  
Data at Garda Division level is very detailed and relates to specific crime categories; however 
it is only available at abroad spatial scale. For the majority of counties the county boundaries 
are used as boundaries for Garda divisions however for certain counties Garda divisions differ.  
Larger counties are broken down into smaller divisions, for example, Dublin is broken down 
into five Garda Divisions - DMR Eastern, DMR North Central, Northern DMR, South Central 
DMR, Southern DMR and Western DMR while Cork County is broken down into three Garda 
divisions - Cork City, Cork North and Cork West. For the purposes of this paper, Garda 
divisions in Cork and Dublin are aggregated to county level as socioeconomic variables are 
only available at this level of aggregation and thus it makes more sense for empirical testing to 
carry out analysis at this level of aggregation. Alternatively, smaller counties are aggregated 
into a single Garda division, for example, Laois and Offaly make up a single Garda division. 
As such, socioeconomic variables for these divisions are given by the average of the two 
counties e.g. unemployment for Laois/Offaly is given by the average of the unemployment rate 
across both counties. 
7 
 
Descriptive statistics for the various crime types, averaged over the 2003-2012 period, are 
reported in Table 1a and b.  
Table 1A Descriptive Statistics for Dependent Variables between 2003 and 2012  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Independent Variables 
Table 1B Descriptive Statistics for Independent Variables between 2003 and 2012  
 No. of 
Obs. 
Mean St. Dev Max Min 
Theft Detection Rate 209 21.51 7.39 7.66 45.65 
Burglary Detection Rate 209 23.37 7.38 8.91 44.74 
Fraud Detection Rate 209 57.31 15.05 22.24 94.15 
Assault Detection Rate 209 68.88 9.57 27.64 94.13 
Sexual Offences Detection Rate 209 59.54 14.93 20 93.75 
Income  210 24,577 5,385 16,092 50,782 
Relative Income 210 93.86 9.17 73.03 118.77 
Unemployment Ratio 210 6.87 3.27 1.87 15.26 
Male 15-24 210 7.49 6.5 0.896 78.21 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     
Table 1a shows the descriptive statistics for crime rates in Ireland between 2003 and 2012. 
Property crimes are more common than violent crimes. Burglary is the highest recorded crime 
with 560 incidents per 100,000 people while sexual offences is the lowest with 41 recorded 
cases per 100,000. Table 1b shows that the likelihood of detection is much higher for violent 
crimes rather than property crimes. Both assault (68.88%) and sexual offences (59.54%) 
display detection rates much greater than those of theft (21.51%) and burglaries (23.37%). 
Moving on, I will now give a brief overview of the variables included in the study, the expected 
relationship of each variable with crime rates and data issues.  
 
No. of 
Obs. 
Mean St. Dev Max Min 
Theft 210 260.71 514.15 50.15 5520.08 
Burglary 210 560.01 204.33 197.91 1105.34 
Fraud 210 87.02 38.12 19.6 303.43 
Assault 210 330.86 76.45 150.22 568.58 
Sexual Offences 210 41.83 33.06 16.27 303.43 
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Deterrence: The detection rate of crime is used in this paper as a proxy for deterrence to engage 
in criminal activities. The detection (or clear up rate) is often used as a measure of the ability 
of police to solve crimes, or even as a general indicator of police performance. Higher detection 
rates are generally associated with lower levels of crime as higher probabilities of conviction 
leads to a reduction in the expected utility of crime. The CSO provide detection rates across a 
range of crimes in Ireland at Garda divisional level between 2003 and 2012. Garda divisional 
detection rates are aggregated up to county level.  
Income: Income has been used as a measure of both legal and illegal activities in crime studies. 
Higher levels of income are associated with both higher rewards for criminals due to increased 
opportunities of lucrative targets. Contrastingly, higher levels of income have also been 
estimated to reduce crime due to more opportunities to earn a living through legal activities. 
These interpretations have led to contrasting results for the estimated impact of income on 
crime levels. This study uses total income per person is used as a measure of income in this 
study. Total income per person is provided by the CSO at a county and NUTS 3 regional level.  
Relative Income: Relative income is measured as the average income per person in a region 
relative to the national average.  
Unemployment Ratio: The unemployment ratio is measured by the percentage of working 
age people on the Live Register in Ireland. The CSO provides data for number of persons on 
the live register in Ireland between 2003 and 2012. The unemployment figure for a given year 
is taken as the number of people on the Live Register in the final month of the year. The 
unemployment ratio is calculated by dividing the unemployment figure by population at county 
level.  
Male 15-24: The male population between 15 and 24 is included in the study as a 
sociodemographic estimate of crime. Studies have shown that this demographic are the most 
likely to engage in particular crimes. The paper uses data from the Census 2002, 2006 and 2011 
to estimate population by Garda division in Ireland. The Census provides population data 
broken down by age group and gender and annual data is estimated using annual average 
growth rates between the Census years. 
III. Methodology 
Framework of this research is based on the Becker–Ehrlich deterrence hypothesis. Notably, 
there are other factors which affect committing crimes, and we will include them as explanatory 
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variables in the specification of model. Crimes are classified as crimes against property 
(property crimes) and crimes against the person (violent crimes), both are assessed empirically 
by econometrics techniques. The empirical analyses on the effect of labour market 
opportunities on crime relies typically on four types of data (Freeman, 1995): aggregate time 
series data, cross-section data, regional panel data and individual level data. Analyses of the 
first two types confirm the existence of a positive relationship between unemployment and 
crime. These studies, even presenting some advantages, are very likely to be affected by biases 
due to the omission of relevant variables. This paper uses a GMM estimation which presents 
significant advantages over alternative methods used in previous studies. Much of this work is 
hampered by endogeneity issues as a result of the reverse causation between crime rates and 
deterrence variables. This paper controls for endogeneity employing an instrumental variable 
approach for panel. 
A. Model Specification 
 
𝑪𝒓𝒊𝒎𝒆𝒊,𝒕 = 𝜶𝒊,𝒕 + 𝑪𝒓𝒊𝒎𝒆𝒊,𝒕−𝟏 +𝑫𝒆𝒕𝒆𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒊,𝒕 + 𝑰𝒏𝒄𝒐𝒎𝒆𝒊,𝒕 + 𝑹𝒆𝒍. 𝑰𝒏𝒄𝒐𝒎𝒆𝒊,𝒕
+ 𝑼𝒏𝒆𝒎𝒑𝒊,𝒕 +𝒎𝒂𝒍𝒆𝟏𝟔 − 𝟐𝟒𝒊,𝒕 + 𝜺𝒊,𝒕 
with i =1... N denoting regions, and t =1...T, denoting time periods.  
Crimei,t = Crime rate per 100,000 
Crimei,t−1 = Lag of Crime rate per 100,000 
Detectioni,t = Detection rate 
Incomei,t = Average Income per person in region 
Rel. Incomei,t = Average Income per person in region/ Average Income per person 
nationally 
Unempi,t = Unemployment ratio    
male16 − 24i,t = Percentage of Males in population between ages 16-24 
In the above specification, αi and β and δ are parameters to be estimated. αi is time invariant 
and control for country specific effects not explicitly included in the regression equation. 
Lagged crime rate measures the persistence of crime over time. Han et al (2013) note there 
could be several reasons why crime rate can be thought to be correlated over time: (1) 
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recidivism caused by, among other things, negative expected payoffs from the labour market 
for being a criminal; (2) business cycle features such as recessions affecting the crime rate over 
successive periods and (3) peer effects with lagged crime acting as a proxy for fluctuating peer 
effects. 
IV. Estimation and Results 
 
This section presents the results of the estimation of the models outlined in section four. The 
section analyses whether crime detection rates act as a deterrence for individuals engaging in 
criminal activities in Ireland as well as interpreting the impact of socioeconomic factors on 
crime in Ireland between 2003 and 2012. The paper is concerned with estimating the 
socioeconomic determinants of crime in Ireland and as such a number of hypothesises have 
been developed in order to estimate the impact of these factors on crime.  
Table 2 presents the results of the estimation of the socioeconomic determinants of crimes 
against property in Ireland between 2003 and 2012. All three crimes against property display a 
negative coefficient on detection rates which indicates that higher detection rates of crime lead 
to a statistically significant reduction in individuals engaging in criminal activity. A ten percent 
increase in detection rates is estimated to reduce theft rates per 100,000 by 2.45%, burglary 
rates per 100,000 by 1.4% and fraud rates per 100,000 by 6.1%. These results are consistent 
with previous research in the area (Han et al, 2013). 
Table 2 GMM Estimation of Crimes against Property in Ireland between 2003 and 2012 
Variable Theft Burglary Fraud 
Crime t-1 
0.387 
(0.063)*** 
0.280 
(0.096)*** 
0.157 
(0.092)* 
Detection Rate  
-0.245 
(0.085)*** 
-0.140 
(0.074)*** 
-0.614 
(0.118)*** 
Income  
1.443 
(0.264)*** 
-0.115 
(0.204) 
0.725 
(0.377)** 
Relative Income 
-1.121 
(0.085)** 
-0.582 
(0.464) 
-1.450 
(0.906) 
Unemployment Ratio 
-0.097 
(0.028)*** 
0.016 
(0.026) 
0.022 
(0.048) 
Male population 
-0.028 
(0.068) 
-0.014 
(0.048) 
 
-0.049 
(0.096) 
Sargan-Hansen 74.74 76.78 66.68 
p-value 0.27 0.21 0.52 
No. of Observations 146 146 146 
*** Significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level.  
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The J-statistic is computed for the Sargan/Hansen over-identifying restrictions. Under the null 
hypothesis that the over-identifying restrictions are valid, the J-statistic follows a Chi-Squared 
distribution with the degree of freedom being the difference between the instrument rank and 
the number of coefficients estimated. The reported over-identification test is the corresponding 
p-value; non-rejection of the Sargan-Hansen test indicates validity of the instrument. 
Crime rates in the previous period is estimated to have a positive and significant impact on 
crime in the current period across all categories of property crime. This indicates that crime 
may have an evolutionary element with regions displaying high levels of crime continuing to 
record high levels of crime in subsequent periods. A ten unit increase in number of crimes per 
100,000 in the previous year is estimated to increase theft per 100,000 by 3.8%, burglary per 
100,000 by 2.8% and fraud per 100,000 by 1.57%. The results indicate that criminals engaging 
in activities involving crime against property respond to crime reduction incentives i.e. higher 
rates of detection. Also, regions with high levels of property crime in previous year tend to 
continue to record high rates of property crime which may indicate self-reinforcing properties 
of crime, evidence of career criminals and knowledge spillovers within a region.  
Turning attention to the socioeconomic determinants to property crime, income per capita is 
estimated to have both a positive and significant impact on crime rates in Ireland for both theft 
and fraud. The sign on the coefficient for burglaries is negative for income however the results 
are insignificant. Entorf and Spengler (2000) note that the results of studies estimating the 
impact of income on crime rates tend to be ambiguous as higher levels of income can be 
considered to both promote and deter crime. Higher levels of income provide more legal 
opportunities while also providing more lucrative criminal activities. A one percent increase in 
income per capita is estimated to increase theft rates by 1.44% while fraud rates increase by 
0.73%. 
Entorf and Spengler (2000) note relative income is much easier to interpret than the standard 
income measure. Relative income is estimated to have a positive impact on the crime rate for 
crimes against property in Ireland between 2003 and 2012. The coefficient on all three 
categories of crime is negative which indicates that an increase in a regions income relative to 
the national average will reduce crime rates for all crimes against property. However, the 
results are only statistically significant for theft rates. A one percent increase in relative income 
leads to a reduction in thefts per 100,000 by 1.12%. 
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Perhaps surprisingly, the unemployment ratio is estimated to have a positive effect on crime 
rates for theft. An increase in the unemployment ratio of 1% is associated with a fall in the theft 
rate of 0.09%, with results statistically significant. A negative coefficient for unemployment is 
found for burglary and fraud rates however the results are not statistically significant. The 
relationship between unemployment and crime rates is found to ambiguous at best. Han et al 
(2013) in a find an increase in unemployment leads to a decrease in burglary and fraud rates 
while an inverse relationship is evident for theft rates. One possible explanation for this is the 
unemployment rate captures the net effect of two countervailing forces – while higher 
unemployment motivates potential offenders to commit crime by reducing the opportunity cost 
of crime, it also reduces the opportunities available for crime thus presenting different impacts 
across crimes. 
The results differ to that of Hagenden (2015) in a study of Ireland finds a deterioration in the 
labour market is associated with higher crime rates, with a property crime elasticity of 0.5. This 
implies that a 10% rise in numbers on the Live Register increases thefts and burglaries by 5%. 
There could be several possible reasons for this difference. Firstly, differences in aggregate 
levels could contribute to differences results. Also, Hagenden (2015) uses total number of 
crimes as the dependent variable and total number of people on live register as the independent 
variable while this study uses crime rates per 100,000 population as dependent variable and 
county unemployment ratio i.e. number of unemployed per working population in county as 
independent variable. Third, direct comparison of this study with Hagenden (2015) is further 
complicated by the fact that different set of explanatory variables, different model 
specifications and a different estimation methodology are included compared to this study. The 
results indicate that the percentage of males between the ages of 15-24 in the population is 
insignificant on crime rates.  
Continuing on to violent crimes, Table 3 presents the results of the estimation of the 
socioeconomic determinants of crimes against person in Ireland between 2003 and 2012. 
Similar to previous literature (Han et al 2013; Hagenden 2015) the results of the detection rate 
on crimes tends to be more ambiguous across crimes against the person compared to crimes 
against property.  
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Table 2 GMM Estimation of Crimes against Persons in Ireland between 2003 and 2012 
Variable Assault 
Sexual 
Offences 
Crime t-1 
0.466 
(0.102)*** 
0.003 
(0.127) 
Detection Rate  
0.026 
(0.082) 
-0.119 
(0.140) 
Income  
1.047 
(0.165)*** 
-4.096 
(0.497)*** 
Relative Income 
-1.08 
(0.349)*** 
2.519 
(1.115)** 
Unemployment 
Ratio 
-0.034 
(0.022) 
0.106 
(0.053)** 
Male population 
-0.000 
(0.036) 
-0.174 
(0.120) 
Sargan-Hansen 66.49 74.22 
p-value 0.52 0.28 
No. of Observations 146 146 
*** Significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level. 
Detection rates are estimated to have no significant effect on crimes against the person in 
Ireland between 2003 and 2012. One explanation for this is that detection may not reduce all 
crimes as there may be some ‘type’ criminals who would not respond to incentives. Crime rates 
in the previous period are found to have a positive impact on crime rates in the current period. 
The coefficient is positive for both assault rates and sexual offences rates however the results 
are only significant for assault rates. A one unit increase in assaults per 100,000 in the previous 
period leads to an increase in assaults in current period of 0.46%. 
The estimates for the socioeconomic determinants of crimes against the person tend to be 
ambiguous. The coefficient on income is positive for assault rates while it is negative for sexual 
offences. This indicates that an increase in income leads to an increase in assaults while it leads 
to a fall in sexual offences, both results are statistically significant. An inverse relationship is 
evident between income and relative income i.e. when income is positive, relative income is 
negative and vice versa. An increase in relative income is found to reduce the rate of crime for 
assault while it is estimated to increase the rate of crime for sexual offences.  
Similarly, the results of the unemployment ratio are found to be ambiguous for crimes against 
the person. A one percent increase in the unemployment ratio is estimated to increase the sexual 
offences rate per 100,000 by 0.11%, while the results for the impact of the unemployment ratio 
on assault rates is not statistically significant. Similar to crimes against property, the percentage 
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of males aged between 15 and 64 are estimated to be insignificant on crime rates across all 
categories of crime in Ireland between 2003 and 2012. 
V. Conclusion 
This paper contributes to the literature on how property and violent crime responds to social, 
economic and law enforcement conditions at county level in Ireland. The results of the paper 
support the economic theory of crime outlined by Becker (1968) which indicates that criminals 
respond to incentives, particularly for property crimes. Higher rates of crime detection are 
associated with a fall in crime rates across all property crimes. A dynamic GMM model with 
fixed effects has been estimated which eliminates any time-invariant unobservable differences 
between counties that jointly determines the crime rate and (any of) our explanatory variables. 
Additionally, the potentially endogenous law enforcement variables, detection rate, has been 
instrumented by using past lagged values of these variables as instruments. This addresses the 
concern of potential reverse causality for this variable which has hampered previous studies in 
the area. 
The use of GMM allows for the inclusion of lagged endogenous variable as an explanatory 
variable. This paper finds that the lagged variable is statistically and economically significant 
across all crime types, with the exception of sexual offences. This indicates that regions with 
high levels of property crime in previous year tend to continue to record high rates of property 
crime which may indicate self-reinforcing properties of crime, evidence of potential career 
criminals and knowledge spillovers within a region. In line with the literature in the area, higher 
detection rates have been found to reduce crime rates for property crimes while the impact on 
crimes against the person is insignificant. A ten percent increase in detection rates is estimated 
to reduce theft rates per 100,000 by 2.45%, burglary rates per 100,000 by 1.4% and fraud rates 
per 100,000 by 6.1%. 
The socioeconomic determinants of crime tend to be more ambiguous with the significance of 
each variable varying across different crime types. Socioeconomic factors have the greatest 
impact on theft rates. While increases in income per capita is found to increase theft rates, 
possibly as a result of more lucrative illegal opportunities, increases in both relative income 
and unemployment is found to reduce the theft rate. For crimes against the person, the income 
variables are found to statistically significant though has opposing effects on each crime type. 
Increase in income are found to increase the number of assaults while lowering the number of 
sexual offences. 
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